Complete deferred audit LOWs: kicker-cache eviction, abandoned-challenge reclaim, and a challenge-response gossip handshake

modules/gameserv/src/lib.rs

@@ -151,6 +151,13 @@ impl GameServ {
             ctx.notice(me, from.uid, "You cannot challenge yourself.");
             return;
         }
+        // Reclaim pending challenges both of whose parties have since gone offline:
+        // an abandoned offer can never be accepted, so it shouldn't keep holding a
+        // slot against the caps below. Active games are left alone (a player may
+        // reconnect and resume).
+        self.games.retain(|_, g| {
+            g.status != Status::Pending || net.uid_by_nick(&g.nick_a).is_some() || net.uid_by_nick(&g.nick_b).is_some()
+        });
         // Global cap: the per-user cap keys on a churnable identity (a guest's nick),
         // so a single connection could otherwise cycle nicks to grow the games map
         // without bound. Bounding the total makes that impossible regardless.

src/engine/mod.rs

@@ -825,6 +825,27 @@ impl Engine {
             .unwrap_or_else(|| self.db.default_language())
     }
 
+    // Forget kicker caches for channels that no longer exist (dropped by command
+    // or expired), so a long-running process doesn't accumulate them. Correctness
+    // never relied on this — entries are keyed by (rev, ts) and a re-registered
+    // channel gets a fresh ts, so a stale entry can't false-match; this only
+    // reclaims memory. Runs on the periodic sweep, covering both drop paths.
+    fn prune_kicker_caches(&mut self) {
+        let (dead_bw, dead_tr) = {
+            let db = &self.db;
+            (
+                self.badword_cache.keys().filter(|c| db.channel(c.as_str()).is_none()).cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>(),
+                self.trigger_cache.keys().filter(|c| db.channel(c.as_str()).is_none()).cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>(),
+            )
+        };
+        for c in dead_bw {
+            self.badword_cache.remove(&c);
+        }
+        for c in dead_tr {
+            self.trigger_cache.remove(&c);
+        }
+    }
+
     pub fn expire_sweep(&mut self) {
         let now = self.now_secs();
         // First, warn owners whose account/channel is approaching expiry and for
@@ -881,6 +902,7 @@ impl Engine {
         for action in self.reconcile_bots() {
             self.emit_irc(action);
         }
+        self.prune_kicker_caches();
     }
 
     // The news items of `kind` as server-sourced notices to `uid`, each tagged

src/gossip.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ use std::time::Duration;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use tokio::io::{AsyncBufRead, AsyncRead, AsyncReadExt, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt, BufReader};
 use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
+use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
+use sha2::Sha256;
+use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
+use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, Engine as _};
 
 // Caps to keep an untrusted (or not-yet-authenticated) peer from exhausting us: a
 // single line can't grow an unbounded buffer, and the handshake can't hang forever.
@@ -34,11 +38,28 @@ async fn read_line_capped<R: AsyncBufRead + Unpin>(reader: &mut R, max: usize) -
     }
 }
 
-// Constant-time equality for the shared secret, so a connecting peer can't learn it
+// Constant-time string equality (for the handshake proof), so a peer can't learn
-// byte-by-byte from a timing side channel.
+// it byte-by-byte from a timing side channel.
-fn secret_eq(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
+fn ct_str_eq(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
     a.len() == b.len() && a.as_bytes().ct_eq(b.as_bytes()).into()
 }
+
+// A fresh random challenge nonce.
+fn make_nonce() -> String {
+    let mut b = [0u8; 24];
+    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut b);
+    STANDARD.encode(b)
+}
+
+// Proof of holding the shared secret: HMAC-SHA256(secret, the peer's nonce). The
+// secret itself never crosses the wire — the peer verifies this against the nonce
+// it chose, so an eavesdropper (or a peer with the wrong secret) can't reproduce
+// it and can't replay it on a later connection (fresh nonce each time).
+fn auth_proof(secret: &str, nonce: &str) -> String {
+    let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_from_slice(secret.as_bytes()).expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
+    mac.update(nonce.as_bytes());
+    STANDARD.encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes())
+}
 use tokio::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
 use tokio::sync::{broadcast, mpsc, Mutex};
 use tokio_rustls::rustls::pki_types::{CertificateDer, PrivateKeyDer, ServerName};
@@ -61,7 +82,8 @@ const REDIAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5); // reconnect backoff for dialed
 #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(tag = "t", rename_all = "lowercase")]
 enum Msg {
-    Hello { secret: String, origin: String },
+    Hello { origin: String, nonce: String },
+    Auth { proof: String },
     // A version vector. `reply` asks the peer to answer with its own digest, so a
     // node that dropped a push can pull back exactly what the peer is missing.
     Digest {
@@ -84,9 +106,11 @@ pub async fn run(engine: Shared, cfg: Gossip, peers: Vec<Peer>, origin: String,
     let acceptor = tls.as_ref().map(|(a, _)| a.clone());
     let connector = tls.as_ref().map(|(_, c)| c.clone());
     if cfg.tls.is_none() {
-        // The handshake exchanges the shared secret before the peer is authenticated,
+        // The secret itself is never sent (auth is challenge-response), but without
-        // so without TLS a passive eavesdropper on the link can learn it. Encrypt it.
+        // TLS the replicated records still cross the wire in cleartext and aren't
-        tracing::warn!("gossip has no [gossip.tls] — the shared secret crosses the wire in plaintext; enable TLS for any non-loopback peer");
+        // integrity-protected at the transport, so an active MITM could tamper with
+        // unsigned entries. Encrypt any non-loopback link.
+        tracing::warn!("gossip has no [gossip.tls] — replicated data crosses the wire unencrypted; enable TLS (and per-origin signing) for any non-loopback peer");
     }
     if let Some(bind) = cfg.bind.clone() {
         tokio::spawn(listen(bind, engine.clone(), cfg.secret.clone(), origin.clone(), outbound.clone(), acceptor));
@@ -193,6 +217,15 @@ fn load_roots(path: &str) -> anyhow::Result<RootCertStore> {
     Ok(roots)
 }
 
+// Read one handshake message, timeout-bounded and size-capped. `None` on EOF,
+// read/parse error, oversized line, or timeout.
+async fn read_handshake<R: AsyncBufRead + Unpin>(reader: &mut R) -> Option<Msg> {
+    match tokio::time::timeout(HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT, read_line_capped(reader, MAX_GOSSIP_LINE)).await {
+        Ok(Ok(Some(line))) => serde_json::from_str::<Msg>(&line).ok(),
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
 // One peer connection: authenticate, then run anti-entropy until it drops.
 async fn session<S>(stream: S, engine: Shared, secret: String, origin: String, outbound: Outbound) -> anyhow::Result<()>
 where
@@ -211,22 +244,28 @@ where
         }
     });
 
-    // Handshake: send our hello, require a matching secret back.
+    // Handshake: a mutual challenge-response over the shared secret, so the secret
-    let _ = send(&tx, &Msg::Hello { secret: secret.clone(), origin }).await;
+    // itself never crosses the wire. Each side sends a random nonce, then proves it
-    let hello = tokio::time::timeout(HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT, read_line_capped(&mut reader, MAX_GOSSIP_LINE)).await;
+    // holds the secret by returning HMAC(secret, the peer's nonce); each verifies
-    match hello {
+    // the peer's proof against the nonce it chose. A wrong secret (or an
-        Ok(Ok(Some(line))) => match serde_json::from_str::<Msg>(&line) {
+    // eavesdropper) can't produce a valid proof, and a fresh nonce per link stops
-            Ok(Msg::Hello { secret: s, .. }) if secret_eq(&s, &secret) => {}
+    // replay.
+    let my_nonce = make_nonce();
+    let _ = send(&tx, &Msg::Hello { origin, nonce: my_nonce.clone() }).await;
+    let peer_nonce = match read_handshake(&mut reader).await {
+        Some(Msg::Hello { nonce, .. }) => nonce,
+        _ => {
+            writer.abort();
+            anyhow::bail!("peer failed to complete the handshake");
+        }
+    };
+    let _ = send(&tx, &Msg::Auth { proof: auth_proof(&secret, &peer_nonce) }).await;
+    match read_handshake(&mut reader).await {
+        Some(Msg::Auth { proof }) if ct_str_eq(&proof, &auth_proof(&secret, &my_nonce)) => {}
         _ => {
             writer.abort();
             anyhow::bail!("bad gossip handshake");
         }
-        },
-        _ => {
-            // EOF, read error, oversized line, or the handshake timed out.
-            writer.abort();
-            anyhow::bail!("peer failed to complete the handshake");
-        }
     }
 
     // Re-advertise our version vector on a timer. The first tick fires an