Bind game identity to UID (hijack + cap bypass) and warn on plaintext gossip
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2 changed files with 10 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -82,6 +82,11 @@ pub async fn run(engine: Shared, cfg: Gossip, peers: Vec<Peer>, origin: String,
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};
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let acceptor = tls.as_ref().map(|(a, _)| a.clone());
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let connector = tls.as_ref().map(|(_, c)| c.clone());
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if cfg.tls.is_none() {
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// The handshake exchanges the shared secret before the peer is authenticated,
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// so without TLS a passive eavesdropper on the link can learn it. Encrypt it.
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tracing::warn!("gossip has no [gossip.tls] — the shared secret crosses the wire in plaintext; enable TLS for any non-loopback peer");
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}
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if let Some(bind) = cfg.bind.clone() {
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tokio::spawn(listen(bind, engine.clone(), cfg.secret.clone(), origin.clone(), outbound.clone(), acceptor));
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}
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