services: throttle emailed codes to stop RESEND/RESETPASS email-bombing

REGISTER was rate-limited but RESEND and RESETPASS weren't — anyone could
repeatedly request confirmation/reset codes for any account with an address
on file, flooding the victim's inbox and burning the service's sender
reputation. A per-account 60s cooldown (code_issue_wait, mirroring the vhost
request throttle) now gates both paths; guessing was already infeasible
(2^40 code + 5-try limit), so this closes the abuse, not an auth hole.

src/engine/db/account.rs

@@ -177,11 +177,20 @@ impl Db {
         let code = gen_code();
         self.codes.insert(
             key(account),
-            PendingCode { kind, code: code.clone(), deadline: Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(900), tries_left: CODE_TRIES },
+            PendingCode { kind, code: code.clone(), issued: Instant::now(), deadline: Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(900), tries_left: CODE_TRIES },
         );
         code
     }
 
+    /// Seconds the caller must wait before another emailed code for `account`
+    /// (0 = allowed now). Throttles RESEND/RESETPASS against email-bombing.
+    pub fn code_issue_wait(&self, account: &str) -> u64 {
+        self.codes.get(&key(account)).map_or(0, |pc| {
+            let ready = pc.issued + CODE_ISSUE_COOLDOWN;
+            ready.checked_duration_since(Instant::now()).map_or(0, |d| d.as_secs() + 1)
+        })
+    }
+
     /// Consume a code for `account`: true if the purpose and code match and it
     /// hasn't expired. A wrong guess burns a try and the code is dropped once
     /// they run out, so it can't be ground down online.

src/engine/db/mod.rs

@@ -983,6 +983,7 @@ pub struct HostConfig {
 struct PendingCode {
     kind: CodeKind,
     code: String,
+    issued: Instant,
     deadline: Instant,
     tries_left: u8,
 }
@@ -996,6 +997,10 @@ struct AuthThrottle {
 // Wrong-code guesses tolerated before a code is invalidated (defence in depth on
 // top of the code's own entropy).
 const CODE_TRIES: u8 = 5;
+
+// Minimum gap between emailed codes for one account, so RESEND/RESETPASS can't be
+// used to email-bomb an address (or burn the service's sender reputation).
+const CODE_ISSUE_COOLDOWN: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
 // Free password attempts before the exponential backoff kicks in, and its cap.
 const AUTH_FREE_TRIES: u32 = 3;
 const AUTH_MAX_BACKOFF_SECS: u64 = 300;

src/engine/db/store.rs

@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ impl Store for Db {
     fn vhost_request_wait(&self, account: &str) -> u64 {
         Db::vhost_request_wait(self, account)
     }
+    fn code_issue_wait(&self, account: &str) -> u64 {
+        Db::code_issue_wait(self, account)
+    }
     fn take_vhost_request(&mut self, account: &str) -> Result<Option<String>, RegError> {
         Db::take_vhost_request(self, account)
     }

src/engine/register.rs

@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ impl Engine {
                 None => resp("error", "ACCOUNT_UNKNOWN", "No such account."),
                 Some((true, _)) => resp("error", "ALREADY_VERIFIED", "That account is already verified."),
                 Some((false, None)) => resp("error", "NO_EMAIL", "No email address is on file for that account."),
+                Some((false, Some(_))) if self.db.code_issue_wait(&account) > 0 => {
+                    resp("error", "TEMPORARILY_UNAVAILABLE", "A code was just sent — please wait a moment before requesting another.")
+                }
                 Some((false, Some(addr))) => {
                     let code = self.db.issue_code(&account, db::CodeKind::Confirm);
                     let mail = echo_api::email::confirm(self.db.email_brand(), self.db.email_accent(), self.db.email_logo(), &account, &code);

src/engine/tests.rs

@@ -808,6 +808,22 @@
         assert!(to_ns(&mut e, "RESETPASS alice 000000 x").iter().any(|a| matches!(a, NetAction::Notice { text, .. } if text.contains("Invalid or expired"))));
     }
 
+    // RESETPASS is throttled per account so it can't be used to email-bomb the
+    // address on file: a second request inside the cooldown sends no email.
+    #[test]
+    fn resetpass_is_throttled_against_email_bombing() {
+        let mut e = engine_with("nsresetrl", "alice", "sesame");
+        e.db.set_email_enabled(true);
+        e.db.set_email("alice", Some("alice@example.org".into())).unwrap();
+        e.handle(NetEvent::UserConnect { uid: "000AAAAAB".into(), nick: "someone".into(), host: "h".into() , ip: "0.0.0.0".into() });
+        let to_ns = |e: &mut Engine, text: &str| e.handle(NetEvent::Privmsg { from: "000AAAAAB".into(), to: "42SAAAAAA".into(), text: text.into() });
+
+        assert!(to_ns(&mut e, "RESETPASS alice").iter().any(|a| matches!(a, NetAction::SendEmail { .. })), "first request emails a code");
+        let out = to_ns(&mut e, "RESETPASS alice");
+        assert!(!out.iter().any(|a| matches!(a, NetAction::SendEmail { .. })), "second immediate request sends no email: {out:?}");
+        assert!(out.iter().any(|a| matches!(a, NetAction::Notice { text, .. } if text.contains("wait"))), "and tells the caller to wait: {out:?}");
+    }
+
     // With email configured, registering with an address creates an unverified
     // account and emails a confirmation code; CONFIRM <code> verifies it.
     #[test]