services: throttle emailed codes to stop RESEND/RESETPASS email-bombing
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REGISTER was rate-limited but RESEND and RESETPASS weren't — anyone could repeatedly request confirmation/reset codes for any account with an address on file, flooding the victim's inbox and burning the service's sender reputation. A per-account 60s cooldown (code_issue_wait, mirroring the vhost request throttle) now gates both paths; guessing was already infeasible (2^40 code + 5-try limit), so this closes the abuse, not an auth hole.
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7 changed files with 44 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ impl Store for Db {
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fn vhost_request_wait(&self, account: &str) -> u64 {
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Db::vhost_request_wait(self, account)
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}
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fn code_issue_wait(&self, account: &str) -> u64 {
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Db::code_issue_wait(self, account)
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}
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fn take_vhost_request(&mut self, account: &str) -> Result<Option<String>, RegError> {
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Db::take_vhost_request(self, account)
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}
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