Revert strict gossip ingest ordering: it broke convergence across compaction
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Jean Chevronnet 2026-07-19 21:56:05 +00:00
parent 4330ff169b
commit 6a22bee2e1
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3 changed files with 23 additions and 49 deletions

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@ -23,11 +23,16 @@ Each node owns an append-only event log. The log is split into two scopes:
Nodes sync via anti-entropy: each advertises a per-origin version vector, and
peers send whatever Global entries the other is missing. Delivery is idempotent,
so a re-sent entry is dropped. Entries are applied strictly **in order per
origin**; one that arrives ahead of its predecessors (a relay in a 3+-node mesh
racing the direct path) is not applied out of order — the version vector stays at
the last contiguous seq, so the digest re-requests the gap in sequence rather
than losing it.
so a re-sent entry is dropped, and each account/channel event is an idempotent
upsert. A peer converges by accepting any entry newer than its version vector
(including the forward jump a compacted node's log begins at).
> **Known limitation (3+ nodes).** In a relay mesh, an entry can reach a node
> ahead of its predecessors via a longer path, and the current ingest advances the
> version vector past that gap. With two nodes (direct delivery) this never
> happens. Closing it for larger meshes needs a snapshot-epoch marker so a
> compaction jump is distinguishable from a live gap; until then, prefer 2-node
> topologies. This is dormant today (no peers).
## The trust model
@ -75,8 +80,9 @@ Rules:
all account data are on that wire. Echo warns loudly at startup if TLS is off.
- **Firewall** the `bind` port to your peer nodes' IPs only.
- Use a strong random `secret` and rotate it periodically.
- The 2-node path is the most exercised. 3+ nodes work (out-of-order delivery is
buffered), but test your topology before relying on it.
- **Prefer 2 nodes.** Direct delivery keeps replication in order; a 3+-node relay
mesh has a known out-of-order edge (see "Known limitation" above) that isn't
closed yet.
## Tier C — cross-operator federation (per-origin signing)

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@ -894,20 +894,16 @@ impl EventLog {
return Ok(None);
}
}
// Apply strictly in per-origin sequence. The FIRST entry ever seen from an
// origin sets the baseline — a peer syncing from a COMPACTED node starts
// mid-stream (its seqs restart at next_seq(), not 0), so we can't demand 0.
// After that, only the next contiguous seq is accepted; a non-contiguous one
// (an older duplicate, or a future entry a relay delivered ahead of the direct
// path in a 3+-node mesh) is dropped rather than applied, so it can't advance
// the version vector past a gap — the digest then re-requests the gap in order
// instead of losing it forever.
let expected = match self.versions.get(&entry.origin) {
None => entry.seq,
Some(&s) => s + 1,
};
if entry.seq != expected {
return Ok(None);
// Accept any entry newer than what we hold for this origin. A forward jump is
// legitimate here: a peer syncing from a COMPACTED node receives seqs that
// start well above 0 (the intermediate ones were folded into the snapshot),
// and the fold is an idempotent upsert. NOTE: this cannot detect an out-of-
// order relay in a 3+-node mesh (an entry delivered ahead of its predecessors
// advances the version past the gap). Fixing that safely needs a snapshot-epoch
// marker so a compaction jump is distinguishable from a live gap — deferred;
// see docs/federation.md. Not reachable today (no gossip peers).
if self.versions.get(&entry.origin).is_some_and(|&s| entry.seq <= s) {
return Ok(None); // already have it
}
self.persist(&entry)?;
self.lamport = self.lamport.max(entry.lamport).saturating_add(1); // Lamport receive rule

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@ -878,34 +878,6 @@
assert!(lifted, "gossiped ban lift removes the line from the ircd");
}
// A gossiped entry that arrives out of sequence (a relay racing the direct path
// in a 3+-node mesh) must NOT advance the version vector past the gap, or the
// skipped entries are lost forever; the digest re-requests them in order.
#[test]
fn gossip_drops_an_out_of_order_entry_until_the_gap_fills() {
use echo_nickserv::NickServ;
let path = std::env::temp_dir().join("echo-gossip-ooo.jsonl");
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
let mut e = Engine::new(vec![Box::new(NickServ { uid: "42SAAAAAA".into(), guest_nick: "Guest".into(), guest_seq: 0 })], Db::open(&path, "test"));
e.set_sid("42S".into());
let (tx, _rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::unbounded_channel();
e.set_irc_out(tx);
let akill = |seq: u64, mask: &str| LogEntry::for_test("peer", seq, seq + 1, db::Event::AkillAdded {
kind: "G".into(), mask: mask.into(), setter: "op".into(), reason: "x".into(), ts: 0, expires: None,
});
e.gossip_ingest(akill(0, "*@a")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(e.gossip_digest().get("peer"), Some(&0), "first entry applies");
// Seq 2 arrives before seq 1: dropped, version stays at 0.
e.gossip_ingest(akill(2, "*@c")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(e.gossip_digest().get("peer"), Some(&0), "an out-of-order entry doesn't advance the version");
// Seq 1 fills the gap, then the re-delivered seq 2 is contiguous.
e.gossip_ingest(akill(1, "*@b")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(e.gossip_digest().get("peer"), Some(&1));
e.gossip_ingest(akill(2, "*@c")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(e.gossip_digest().get("peer"), Some(&2), "the gap filled, seq 2 now applies");
}
// Losing a registration conflict logs out the local session on that name and
// notifies them over the services-initiated outbound path.
#[test]