Rework the AUTH feed for an admin log channel. Drop the check/cross icons; each
line now reads "account login ok|FAILED - mechanism - from source [- reason]".
The important fix is the source: mid-SASL the client isn't a connected user yet,
so the old lines showed "?" and a cloaked host — capture the real host+IP the
ircd hands us in the SASL H message instead, and fall back to the live user's
nick@host for a NickServ IDENTIFY. Failures now always name the account (which is
attacker-supplied on a bad attempt, so it's stripped of control codes and capped
before it goes in the channel message). Also emit an echo::auth info log so auth
events land on disk, not only in the channel. No secret is ever included.
A pseudo-client that joins the staff log channel and reports what the services
layer is doing in real time: authentication (IDENTIFY and every SASL mechanism,
success and failure, with nick/host/account/reason), sessions (forced logout),
and the account/channel/operator lifecycle — the committed-event audit now
speaks through it, falling back to a server notice when it is off.
The reporting lives in the engine (feed()/who() helpers plus hooks at
complete_authenticate / sasl_login / sasl_deny); the module itself is just the
bot's identity and a STATUS/HELP surface. On by default; the feed is gated on
the configured [log] channel.
Both ran scram verify_plain (~1s PBKDF2 at 1.2M iters) inline under the engine
lock, freezing the whole daemon per login. Add NetAction::DeferAuthenticate +
AuthThen continuation + ctx.defer_authenticate, mirroring DeferPassword: the
module/SASL path fetches the verifier cheaply and defers; the link layer runs
verify_plain on spawn_blocking, then Engine::complete_authenticate finishes the
login (IDENTIFY reuses the same ctx helpers, so its login/AJOIN/vhost/memo
side-effects are unchanged). Tests resolve the defer inline (cfg(test)). The
gRPC web-login path was already fixed; no login path stalls services now.
(GHOST/DROP/CERT/GROUP still verify inline but are rare account ops, not logins.)
The Authenticate RPC held the engine Mutex across scram verify_plain, which at
production iteration counts (1.2M) is ~0.8s of PBKDF2 on the async reactor —
freezing the whole daemon (IRC link, gossip, every RPC) for the duration and
serializing all logins. Fetch the verifier under the lock (cheap), then run
verify_plain on spawn_blocking, lock released. 6 concurrent logins: 823ms (was
~4460ms serialized). set_password/register already offload this way; drop the
now-unused authority_authenticate.
REGISTER was rate-limited but RESEND and RESETPASS weren't — anyone could
repeatedly request confirmation/reset codes for any account with an address
on file, flooding the victim's inbox and burning the service's sender
reputation. A per-account 60s cooldown (code_issue_wait, mirroring the vhost
request throttle) now gates both paths; guessing was already infeasible
(2^40 code + 5-try limit), so this closes the abuse, not an auth hole.
FORBID accepted and stored EMAIL patterns, but nothing ever checked them:
a forbidden address still registered and could be set via NickServ SET
EMAIL. Both paths now reject a matching address (new ForbiddenEmail
outcome), matching how NICK and CHAN forbids already gate registration.
FORBID ADD/DEL/LIST bans a NICK, CHAN, or EMAIL glob from being
registered — a network-wide policy that gossips like an AKILL and every
node enforces. Nick registration is blocked in pre_register_check (both
NickServ REGISTER and the account-registration relay), and channel
registration in ChanServ REGISTER. New Forbid store + events, mirroring
the akill subsystem.
Echo is the authority the ircd account module forwards to: parse
ENCAP <us> SWACCTREG <reqid> <origin> <kind> <account> <p2> :<p3> into an
account request, and answer the origin server with
ENCAP <origin> SWACCTRES <reqid> <kind> <account> <status> <code> :<message>.
Thread the origin through the reply so responses route back to the
requesting server. Replaces the placeholder ACCTREGISTER/ACCTREGRESULT
names that nothing on the wire actually spoke.
Credentials: the SCRAM-SHA-256 verifier is now the only password
credential. PLAIN and IDENTIFY verify the plaintext against it via
scram::verify_plain, exactly as a SCRAM login proves knowledge of it, so
an account provisioned from a verifier alone (external authority) works
over every mechanism, not only SCRAM. Removed the redundant argon2 hash
entirely: the field, the Credentials member, the AccountPasswordSet
field, hash_password/verify_password, and the argon2 crate. SASL SCRAM
already forces a PBKDF2 verifier into the store, so the hash never raised
the at-rest floor. OS RNG now comes from rand_core.
Registration: finished draft/account-registration over the ircd relay.
VERIFY confirms the emailed code, RESEND reissues it, STATUS reports
state, and REGISTER now emails the code and replies verification_required
on the relay path too, not only through NickServ.
Rebrand the daemon and workspace: the binary is now `echo`, every crate
is `echo-*` (`echo-api` and the module crates), Rust imports use
`echo_*`, the gRPC proto is `proto/echo.proto` with package `echo.v1`,
and the log filter, gossip peer-name default, and on-disk store default
(`echo.db.jsonl`) follow. Docs updated throughout. No behaviour change;
crate directories and the config schema are untouched.
engine/mod.rs had grown past 5k lines, most of it one test module and
a few large method clusters. Lift the tests into engine/tests.rs, and
move the cohesive method groups into sibling files — sasl, kicker
(chat policing), register (account-authority relay), and dispatch
(service routing and fantasy). The Engine type, its master event
handler, shared helpers, and the small state structs stay in mod.rs;
each sibling adds its own impl Engine block. Pure reorganisation: no
behaviour change, tests unchanged and green.
