proxy: forward v2 TLS TLVs (PP2_TYPE_SSL/CERTFP) so plaintext clients behind a TLS-terminating proxy show secure+certfp; restore ws_trust_proxy to the config example

This commit is contained in:
Jean Chevronnet 2026-08-11 17:13:32 +00:00
parent 4f6c0ded48
commit 6ffd6a57bc
3 changed files with 128 additions and 23 deletions

View file

@ -149,7 +149,9 @@ amu_target = both
# ws_origin = https://x.example # (repeatable) allowed Origin globs; empty = any
# ws_defaultmode = text # frame mode with no subprotocol: text|binary|reject
# ws_proxyranges = 127.0.0.1 # (repeatable) glob/CIDR of proxies whose
# # X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For we trust
# # X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For we trust (scoped)
# ws_trust_proxy = no # trust those headers from ANY peer (simpler but
# # allows IP spoofing; prefer ws_proxyranges)
# ws_allowmissingorigin = yes # allow clients that send no Origin header
# ws_nativeping = yes # liveness via WebSocket pings (no = IRC PING)
# ws_handshake_timeout = 10 # seconds to complete the HTTP Upgrade

View file

@ -19,8 +19,14 @@ const V1_MAX: usize = 107;
/// The result of trying to parse a PROXY header from a byte prefix.
pub enum Parsed {
/// A full header giving the real client (source) address.
Proxy(SocketAddr),
/// A full header giving the real client (source) address, plus any TLS metadata
/// a v2 header forwarded (a TLS-terminating proxy sets `secure` and, if it
/// forwards one, the client cert `certfp`).
Proxy {
addr: SocketAddr,
secure: bool,
certfp: Option<String>,
},
/// A full header with no address to apply (LOCAL / unsupported family).
Local,
/// Not enough bytes yet — read more and retry.
@ -91,7 +97,14 @@ fn parse_v1(buf: &[u8]) -> (Parsed, usize) {
return (Parsed::Invalid, consumed);
}
match (p[2].parse::<IpAddr>(), p[4].parse::<u16>()) {
(Ok(ip), Ok(port)) => (Parsed::Proxy(SocketAddr::new(ip, port)), consumed),
(Ok(ip), Ok(port)) => (
Parsed::Proxy {
addr: SocketAddr::new(ip, port),
secure: false,
certfp: None,
},
consumed,
),
_ => (Parsed::Invalid, consumed),
}
}
@ -122,23 +135,68 @@ fn parse_v2(buf: &[u8]) -> (Parsed, usize) {
return (Parsed::Invalid, total);
}
let a = &buf[16..total];
match family {
let (addr, fixed) = match family {
1 if len >= 12 => {
let src = Ipv4Addr::new(a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3]);
let sport = u16::from_be_bytes([a[8], a[9]]);
(Parsed::Proxy(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(src), sport)), total)
(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(src), sport), 12)
}
2 if len >= 36 => {
let mut o = [0u8; 16];
o.copy_from_slice(&a[0..16]);
let sport = u16::from_be_bytes([a[32], a[33]]);
(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::from(o)), sport), 36)
}
_ => return (Parsed::Local, total), // AF_UNIX / unspecified: keep peer addr
};
// any bytes after the fixed address are TLVs: a TLS-terminating proxy may
// forward the client's TLS status (PP2_TYPE_SSL) and cert fingerprint (CERTFP)
let (secure, certfp) = parse_v2_tlvs(&a[fixed..]);
(
Parsed::Proxy(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::from(o)), sport)),
Parsed::Proxy {
addr,
secure,
certfp,
},
total,
)
}
_ => (Parsed::Local, total), // AF_UNIX / unspecified: keep peer addr
// PROXY v2 TLV types we care about.
const PP2_TYPE_SSL: u8 = 0x20;
const PP2_TYPE_CERTFP: u8 = 0xE0;
const PP2_CLIENT_SSL: u8 = 0x01;
/// Walk the v2 TLV block: `type(1) len(2, big-endian) value(len)`. Returns whether
/// the client was on TLS and its forwarded cert fingerprint, if any.
fn parse_v2_tlvs(mut tlv: &[u8]) -> (bool, Option<String>) {
let mut secure = false;
let mut certfp = None;
while tlv.len() >= 3 {
let ttype = tlv[0];
let tlen = u16::from_be_bytes([tlv[1], tlv[2]]) as usize;
if tlv.len() < 3 + tlen {
break; // truncated TLV
}
let val = &tlv[3..3 + tlen];
match ttype {
PP2_TYPE_SSL => {
if !val.is_empty() && val[0] & PP2_CLIENT_SSL != 0 {
secure = true;
}
}
PP2_TYPE_CERTFP => {
if let Ok(s) = std::str::from_utf8(val) {
if !s.is_empty() && s.len() <= 128 && s.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
certfp = Some(s.to_string());
}
}
}
_ => {}
}
tlv = &tlv[3 + tlen..];
}
(secure, certfp)
}
#[cfg(test)]
@ -147,7 +205,7 @@ mod tests {
fn src(p: &Parsed) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
match p {
Parsed::Proxy(a) => Some(*a),
Parsed::Proxy { addr, .. } => Some(*addr),
_ => None,
}
}
@ -192,6 +250,37 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(n, 28);
}
#[test]
fn v2_tls_tlvs() {
// a TLS-terminating proxy forwards PP2_TYPE_SSL (client-on-TLS) + CERTFP
let mut h = V2_SIG.to_vec();
h.push(0x21); // v2, PROXY
h.push(0x11); // AF_INET, STREAM
h.extend_from_slice(&31u16.to_be_bytes()); // 12 addr + 8 SSL TLV + 11 CERTFP TLV
h.extend_from_slice(&[198, 51, 100, 10]); // src
h.extend_from_slice(&[10, 0, 0, 1]); // dst
h.extend_from_slice(&5000u16.to_be_bytes());
h.extend_from_slice(&443u16.to_be_bytes());
h.push(0x20); // PP2_TYPE_SSL
h.extend_from_slice(&5u16.to_be_bytes());
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x01, 0, 0, 0, 0]); // client=PP2_CLIENT_SSL, verify=0
h.push(0xE0); // PP2_TYPE_CERTFP
h.extend_from_slice(&8u16.to_be_bytes());
h.extend_from_slice(b"abcd1234");
match parse(&h).0 {
Parsed::Proxy {
addr,
secure,
certfp,
} => {
assert_eq!(addr.to_string(), "198.51.100.10:5000");
assert!(secure);
assert_eq!(certfp.as_deref(), Some("abcd1234"));
}
_ => panic!("expected Proxy"),
}
}
#[test]
fn v2_partial_and_local() {
assert!(matches!(parse(&V2_SIG[..8]), (Parsed::Need, _)));

View file

@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ fn read_conn(poll: &mut Poll, conns: &mut HashMap<usize, Conn>, t: usize, core:
let mut chunk = [0u8; 8192];
let mut lines: Vec<(Uid, String)> = Vec::new();
// a deferred Connect (PROXY conn) to emit, before any lines from the same read
let mut connect: Option<(Uid, SocketAddr, u16, OutSink)> = None;
let mut connect: Option<(Uid, SocketAddr, u16, bool, Option<String>, OutSink)> = None;
let mut close = false;
if let Some(c) = conns.get_mut(&t) {
loop {
@ -381,6 +381,10 @@ fn read_conn(poll: &mut Poll, conns: &mut HashMap<usize, Conn>, t: usize, core:
Ok(n) => {
c.rbuf.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]);
if c.proxy_pending {
// a v2 header from a TLS-terminating proxy can forward the
// client's TLS status + cert fingerprint (see modules::proxy)
let mut psecure = false;
let mut pcertfp: Option<String> = None;
match crate::proxy::parse(&c.rbuf) {
(crate::proxy::Parsed::Need, _) => {
if c.rbuf.len() > PROXY_MAX {
@ -393,10 +397,19 @@ fn read_conn(poll: &mut Poll, conns: &mut HashMap<usize, Conn>, t: usize, core:
close = true;
break;
}
(crate::proxy::Parsed::Proxy(real), used) => {
c.addr = real; // rewrite to the real client address
(
crate::proxy::Parsed::Proxy {
addr,
secure,
certfp,
},
used,
) => {
c.addr = addr; // rewrite to the real client address
c.rbuf.drain(..used);
c.proxy_pending = false;
psecure = secure;
pcertfp = certfp;
}
(crate::proxy::Parsed::Local, used) => {
c.rbuf.drain(..used); // keep the peer addr
@ -404,10 +417,9 @@ fn read_conn(poll: &mut Poll, conns: &mut HashMap<usize, Conn>, t: usize, core:
}
}
if !c.proxy_pending {
connect = c
.pending_out
.take()
.map(|out| (c.uid, c.addr, c.local_port, out));
connect = c.pending_out.take().map(|out| {
(c.uid, c.addr, c.local_port, psecure, pcertfp, out)
});
}
}
if !c.proxy_pending {
@ -433,15 +445,15 @@ fn read_conn(poll: &mut Poll, conns: &mut HashMap<usize, Conn>, t: usize, core:
}
}
}
if let Some((uid, addr, local_port, out)) = connect {
if let Some((uid, addr, local_port, secure, certfp, out)) = connect {
if core
.send(Event::Connect {
uid,
addr,
out,
sock: None,
secure: false,
certfp: None,
secure,
certfp,
local_port,
link: false,
outbound: false,
@ -690,8 +702,10 @@ fn tls_conn(
.any(|g| crate::modules::connclass::ip_matches(g, &addr.ip().to_string()))
{
let _ = stream.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5)));
// echo terminates TLS on this listener, so only the client address is taken
// from the header (its TLS TLVs would be redundant here).
let real = match crate::proxy::read_header(&mut stream) {
crate::proxy::Parsed::Proxy(a) => a,
crate::proxy::Parsed::Proxy { addr, .. } => addr,
crate::proxy::Parsed::Local => addr,
_ => {
let _ = shutdown.shutdown(Shutdown::Both);