auth: constant-time compare for VHOST and WEBIRC secrets — both used plain == on the config password, unlike oper/RPC/JWT secrets which already route through ct_eq; expose password_hash::ct_eq as the shared comparator and use it (usernames stay plain == — not secret)

This commit is contained in:
Jean Chevronnet 2026-08-19 00:41:47 +00:00
parent c72b966e0a
commit a09dfc74df
2 changed files with 13 additions and 3 deletions

View file

@ -43,7 +43,12 @@ impl Command for Vhost {
let host = s.conf_all("vhost").iter().find_map(|line| {
let mut it = line.split_whitespace();
match (it.next(), it.next(), it.next()) {
(Some(u), Some(p), Some(h)) if u == user && p == pass => Some(h.to_string()),
(Some(u), Some(p), Some(h))
if u == user
&& crate::modules::password_hash::ct_eq(p.as_bytes(), pass.as_bytes()) =>
{
Some(h.to_string())
}
_ => None,
}
});
@ -104,7 +109,11 @@ impl Command for WebIrc {
let Some(gw) = s
.webirc
.iter()
.find(|g| g.password == *pass && !g.ipmask.is_empty() && glob_match(&g.ipmask, &from))
.find(|g| {
crate::modules::password_hash::ct_eq(g.password.as_bytes(), pass.as_bytes())
&& !g.ipmask.is_empty()
&& glob_match(&g.ipmask, &from)
})
.map(|g| g.name.clone())
else {
s.notice_star(uid, "WEBIRC: invalid credentials");

View file

@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ fn unhex(s: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
/// Constant-time equality (guards against timing attacks on the compare).
/// `openssl::memcmp::eq` requires equal-length inputs, so short-circuit first.
fn ct_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
/// Shared comparator for any secret check (passwords, gateway/vhost secrets).
pub fn ct_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
a.len() == b.len() && openssl::memcmp::eq(a, b)
}