echoIRCd/src/proxy.rs

293 lines
9.7 KiB
Rust

//! HAProxy PROXY protocol (v1 text + v2 binary) — the header a trusted load
//! balancer / TCP proxy prepends to a connection to carry the real client address.
//! Only the source address is needed; when the header says LOCAL (a health check)
//! or an address family we don't translate, the original peer address is kept.
//!
//! Enabled per source with `proxy = <ip glob>` (repeatable); connections from a
//! matching proxy must lead with a PROXY header, which is stripped before the first
//! IRC byte so `add_conn`'s connect-time checks see the real client IP.
use std::io::Read;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr};
/// The 12-byte v2 signature.
const V2_SIG: [u8; 12] = [
0x0D, 0x0A, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x51, 0x55, 0x49, 0x54, 0x0A,
];
/// A v1 line is at most 107 bytes including CRLF.
const V1_MAX: usize = 107;
/// The result of trying to parse a PROXY header from a byte prefix.
pub enum Parsed {
/// A full header giving the real client (source) address, plus any TLS metadata
/// a v2 header forwarded (a TLS-terminating proxy sets `secure` and, if it
/// forwards one, the client cert `certfp`).
Proxy {
addr: SocketAddr,
secure: bool,
certfp: Option<String>,
},
/// A full header with no address to apply (LOCAL / unsupported family).
Local,
/// Not enough bytes yet — read more and retry.
Need,
/// Not a valid PROXY header.
Invalid,
}
/// Try to parse a PROXY header at the start of `buf`. Returns the parse result and,
/// when a full header was consumed, how many bytes it occupied.
pub fn parse(buf: &[u8]) -> (Parsed, usize) {
let vlen = buf.len().min(12);
if buf[..vlen] == V2_SIG[..vlen] {
if buf.len() < 12 {
return (Parsed::Need, 0);
}
return parse_v2(buf);
}
if buf.starts_with(b"PROXY ") {
return parse_v1(buf);
}
if buf.len() < 6 && b"PROXY "[..buf.len()] == *buf {
return (Parsed::Need, 0); // still could become "PROXY "
}
(Parsed::Invalid, 0)
}
/// Blocking-read exactly one PROXY header from `r` for the thread-model paths (TLS).
/// Reads a byte at a time and re-parses, so it never consumes bytes past the header
/// (which would corrupt the following TLS handshake).
pub fn read_header<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Parsed {
let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(64);
let mut one = [0u8; 1];
loop {
match r.read(&mut one) {
Ok(0) | Err(_) => return Parsed::Invalid,
Ok(_) => buf.push(one[0]),
}
if buf.len() > 256 {
return Parsed::Invalid;
}
match parse(&buf) {
(Parsed::Need, _) => continue,
(result, _) => return result, // complete: used == buf.len() by construction
}
}
}
fn parse_v1(buf: &[u8]) -> (Parsed, usize) {
let Some(nl) = buf.windows(2).position(|w| w == b"\r\n") else {
return if buf.len() > V1_MAX {
(Parsed::Invalid, 0)
} else {
(Parsed::Need, 0)
};
};
let consumed = nl + 2;
let Ok(line) = std::str::from_utf8(&buf[..nl]) else {
return (Parsed::Invalid, consumed);
};
let p: Vec<&str> = line.split(' ').collect();
if p.len() < 2 {
return (Parsed::Invalid, consumed);
}
match p[1] {
"TCP4" | "TCP6" => {
if p.len() != 6 {
return (Parsed::Invalid, consumed);
}
match (p[2].parse::<IpAddr>(), p[4].parse::<u16>()) {
(Ok(ip), Ok(port)) => (
Parsed::Proxy {
addr: SocketAddr::new(ip, port),
secure: false,
certfp: None,
},
consumed,
),
_ => (Parsed::Invalid, consumed),
}
}
"UNKNOWN" => (Parsed::Local, consumed),
_ => (Parsed::Invalid, consumed),
}
}
fn parse_v2(buf: &[u8]) -> (Parsed, usize) {
if buf.len() < 16 {
return (Parsed::Need, 0);
}
let ver_cmd = buf[12];
if ver_cmd >> 4 != 2 {
return (Parsed::Invalid, 0);
}
let cmd = ver_cmd & 0x0f;
let family = buf[13] >> 4;
let len = u16::from_be_bytes([buf[14], buf[15]]) as usize;
let total = 16 + len;
if buf.len() < total {
return (Parsed::Need, 0);
}
if cmd == 0 {
return (Parsed::Local, total); // LOCAL (health check)
}
if cmd != 1 {
return (Parsed::Invalid, total);
}
let a = &buf[16..total];
let (addr, fixed) = match family {
1 if len >= 12 => {
let src = Ipv4Addr::new(a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3]);
let sport = u16::from_be_bytes([a[8], a[9]]);
(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(src), sport), 12)
}
2 if len >= 36 => {
let mut o = [0u8; 16];
o.copy_from_slice(&a[0..16]);
let sport = u16::from_be_bytes([a[32], a[33]]);
(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::from(o)), sport), 36)
}
_ => return (Parsed::Local, total), // AF_UNIX / unspecified: keep peer addr
};
// any bytes after the fixed address are TLVs: a TLS-terminating proxy may
// forward the client's TLS status (PP2_TYPE_SSL) and cert fingerprint (CERTFP)
let (secure, certfp) = parse_v2_tlvs(&a[fixed..]);
(
Parsed::Proxy {
addr,
secure,
certfp,
},
total,
)
}
// PROXY v2 TLV types we care about.
const PP2_TYPE_SSL: u8 = 0x20;
const PP2_TYPE_CERTFP: u8 = 0xE0;
const PP2_CLIENT_SSL: u8 = 0x01;
/// Walk the v2 TLV block: `type(1) len(2, big-endian) value(len)`. Returns whether
/// the client was on TLS and its forwarded cert fingerprint, if any.
fn parse_v2_tlvs(mut tlv: &[u8]) -> (bool, Option<String>) {
let mut secure = false;
let mut certfp = None;
while tlv.len() >= 3 {
let ttype = tlv[0];
let tlen = u16::from_be_bytes([tlv[1], tlv[2]]) as usize;
if tlv.len() < 3 + tlen {
break; // truncated TLV
}
let val = &tlv[3..3 + tlen];
match ttype {
PP2_TYPE_SSL => {
if !val.is_empty() && val[0] & PP2_CLIENT_SSL != 0 {
secure = true;
}
}
PP2_TYPE_CERTFP => {
if let Ok(s) = std::str::from_utf8(val) {
if !s.is_empty() && s.len() <= 128 && s.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
certfp = Some(s.to_string());
}
}
}
_ => {}
}
tlv = &tlv[3 + tlen..];
}
(secure, certfp)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn src(p: &Parsed) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
match p {
Parsed::Proxy { addr, .. } => Some(*addr),
_ => None,
}
}
#[test]
fn v1_tcp4() {
let (r, n) = parse(b"PROXY TCP4 192.0.2.9 10.0.0.1 56324 6667\r\nNICK bob\r\n");
assert_eq!(src(&r).unwrap().to_string(), "192.0.2.9:56324");
assert_eq!(n, 42); // header up to and including CRLF
}
#[test]
fn v1_partial_needs_more() {
assert!(matches!(parse(b"PROXY TCP4 192.0.2.9 10.0"), (Parsed::Need, _)));
assert!(matches!(parse(b"PRO"), (Parsed::Need, _)));
}
#[test]
fn v1_unknown_is_local() {
assert!(matches!(parse(b"PROXY UNKNOWN\r\n"), (Parsed::Local, _)));
}
#[test]
fn v1_garbage_invalid() {
assert!(matches!(parse(b"HELLO THERE\r\n"), (Parsed::Invalid, _)));
assert!(matches!(parse(b"PROXY TCP4 bad ip x y\r\n"), (Parsed::Invalid, _)));
}
#[test]
fn v2_ipv4() {
let mut h = V2_SIG.to_vec();
h.push(0x21); // v2, PROXY
h.push(0x11); // AF_INET, STREAM
h.extend_from_slice(&12u16.to_be_bytes());
h.extend_from_slice(&[203, 0, 113, 7]); // src ip
h.extend_from_slice(&[10, 0, 0, 1]); // dst ip
h.extend_from_slice(&0xC000u16.to_be_bytes()); // src port 49152
h.extend_from_slice(&6667u16.to_be_bytes()); // dst port
h.extend_from_slice(b"NICK x\r\n");
let (r, n) = parse(&h);
assert_eq!(src(&r).unwrap().to_string(), "203.0.113.7:49152");
assert_eq!(n, 28);
}
#[test]
fn v2_tls_tlvs() {
// a TLS-terminating proxy forwards PP2_TYPE_SSL (client-on-TLS) + CERTFP
let mut h = V2_SIG.to_vec();
h.push(0x21); // v2, PROXY
h.push(0x11); // AF_INET, STREAM
h.extend_from_slice(&31u16.to_be_bytes()); // 12 addr + 8 SSL TLV + 11 CERTFP TLV
h.extend_from_slice(&[198, 51, 100, 10]); // src
h.extend_from_slice(&[10, 0, 0, 1]); // dst
h.extend_from_slice(&5000u16.to_be_bytes());
h.extend_from_slice(&443u16.to_be_bytes());
h.push(0x20); // PP2_TYPE_SSL
h.extend_from_slice(&5u16.to_be_bytes());
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x01, 0, 0, 0, 0]); // client=PP2_CLIENT_SSL, verify=0
h.push(0xE0); // PP2_TYPE_CERTFP
h.extend_from_slice(&8u16.to_be_bytes());
h.extend_from_slice(b"abcd1234");
match parse(&h).0 {
Parsed::Proxy {
addr,
secure,
certfp,
} => {
assert_eq!(addr.to_string(), "198.51.100.10:5000");
assert!(secure);
assert_eq!(certfp.as_deref(), Some("abcd1234"));
}
_ => panic!("expected Proxy"),
}
}
#[test]
fn v2_partial_and_local() {
assert!(matches!(parse(&V2_SIG[..8]), (Parsed::Need, _)));
let mut h = V2_SIG.to_vec();
h.push(0x20); // v2, LOCAL
h.push(0x00);
h.extend_from_slice(&0u16.to_be_bytes());
assert!(matches!(parse(&h), (Parsed::Local, 16)));
}
}