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ea3e879068
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connclass: cache resolved connect classes in a config_gen-tagged thread_local — all()/named() (and thus pick/assign and every per-ping/per-message getter) re-parsed the connectclass config and re-resolved parent inheritance on each call; now rebuilt only on rehash
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2026-08-19 01:56:22 +00:00 |
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d4d3886379
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restrictcommands: cache the parsed restriction list (config_gen-tagged) instead of re-tokenizing every restrictcommand line on every command; clone only the one matched rule so the ext borrow drops before the server is used mutably
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2026-08-19 01:54:45 +00:00 |
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cd46cfc49f
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securitygroups: cache parsed groups in a config_gen-tagged thread_local instead of re-parsing all securitygroup lines on every g: extban match and WHOIS — safe on the single-threaded core, re-parses only on rehash
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2026-08-19 01:53:41 +00:00 |
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1da913a249
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autodrop: cache the autodrop-command set (config_gen-tagged) instead of re-splitting autodrop_commands on every packet from an unregistered socket — the path runs hottest under the scanner flood it defends against
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2026-08-19 01:51:57 +00:00 |
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09b4adabbf
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disable: cache the disabled-command set (config_gen-tagged HashSet) instead of re-splitting disabled_commands on every non-oper command — the hottest hook in the server; re-parses only on rehash
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2026-08-19 01:51:31 +00:00 |
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78be7279b0
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server: add a config_gen counter bumped on every rehash — lets modules cache config parsed into a hot-path structure and invalidate it correctly (a REHASH can't leave a stale cache), unblocking the per-message/per-command config re-parse in disable/autodrop/securitygroups/restrictcommands/connclass
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2026-08-19 01:51:08 +00:00 |
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11852332dc
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message: parse on space (0x20) only per RFC — trim_start() also ate tabs, so a param containing a tab (e.g. a trailing ':\t') didn't round-trip through to_wire/parse; the parser fuzz proptest found it. trim_start_matches(' ') makes tabs ordinary param content; regression case pinned
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2026-08-19 01:41:22 +00:00 |
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98e5cf4d20
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relaymsg/showfile: reject whitespace/control chars in a RELAYMSG spoofed nick (defence-in-depth on top of the denylist), and cap the showfile read at 256 KiB so a large /RULES-style file can't stall the core loop
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2026-08-19 01:35:25 +00:00 |
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c47fb9a80a
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syslog: keep the UDP socket cached across send errors instead of dropping it (which re-bound + re-resolved a socket on every notice when the target was unreachable); the Unix datagram path still reopens on failure
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2026-08-19 01:34:24 +00:00 |
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b3f66ec310
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customtitle: return Fail (not Ok) when the crypto pool is at capacity and the TITLE auth is denied, matching the synchronous verify path
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2026-08-19 01:33:34 +00:00 |
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55174ec017
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profilelink/hidelist: unify the WHOIS label to English "Profile:" (was "Profil:" for logged-in users) and make hidelist honour the last matching config line (conf last-wins semantics) instead of the first
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2026-08-19 01:33:05 +00:00 |
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303fc0c8dc
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filehost: use only the final path segment of the URL as the displayed filename tag — the trailing part was taken verbatim (path separators, ../), and while json_esc/escape_tag block injection, a client rendering filename could be misled by traversal; take the basename
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2026-08-19 01:32:17 +00:00 |
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c532828aab
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jwt: match claim_num only against a top-level object key (depth-aware scan), not any substring — a claim whose string value contained "exp": could otherwise spoof the exp an external verifier reads; added nested + string-value regression tests
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2026-08-19 01:31:22 +00:00 |
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c32fbee905
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chanlog: fan the mirrored notice via to_channel (Arc-shared line, per-recipient server-time) instead of collecting a members Vec and cloning the String per member
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2026-08-19 01:29:48 +00:00 |
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2851c0a7ab
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rmode: send a usage NOTICE when the list-mode arg has no mode letter (e.g. RMODE #c 3) instead of failing silently
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2026-08-19 01:29:14 +00:00 |
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b557c9887f
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log_json: cache an open failure so a misconfigured path doesn't re-issue an open() syscall (and silently drop) on every notice — the error is now surfaced once via stderr and not retried until the path changes; the write-failure reopen (for logrotate) is preserved
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2026-08-19 01:28:42 +00:00 |
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65bedaf417
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hidemode: resolve each changed mode's hidden-rank once and each member's rank once, instead of re-scanning the hidemode config for every (member x change) pair on the MODE broadcast hot path
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2026-08-19 01:23:33 +00:00 |
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b59fe70537
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operlevels: use Extensible::set instead of get_or_insert_with(0)-then-overwrite
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2026-08-19 01:22:54 +00:00 |
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d495fd0f30
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channel: cap the per-channel invite set (maxinvites, default 100) — it only shrank when the invitee joined, so an op could grow it unboundedly; re-inviting an already-listed nick still works
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2026-08-19 01:22:32 +00:00 |
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8f5b37bf8d
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dnsbl: cap the number of blocklist zones checked per client at 16 — each zone is a serial blocking DNS lookup, so a long (mis)configured zone list could stall a connecting client's registration for zones.len()*timeout
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2026-08-19 01:21:40 +00:00 |
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b63458816e
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metrics: set read/write timeouts on each scrape connection — the single-threaded accept loop did an untimed read, so one client that connected and never sent blocked every future scrape (slowloris)
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2026-08-19 01:21:21 +00:00 |
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ac3e66e9e0
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metadata: prune a channel's metadata once the channel no longer exists (tick GC) — #channel entries were never freed (unlike user entries on quit), so setting metadata on a channel that later empties leaked memory and kept re-persisting to disk forever; +P channels stay live so keep theirs
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2026-08-19 01:20:23 +00:00 |
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a7f6c264d1
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snoop: gate the per-connect/join/quit eprintln! behind snoop_stderr (default off) — it wrote to stderr (journald) on every client event in the reactor thread, unbounded under a connect flood; the +c/+q snotices already carry the operator-facing signal
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2026-08-19 01:18:58 +00:00 |
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924141683c
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extbanbanlist: identify extbans by the real rule (<letter>:...) instead of "2nd byte is a colon" — the old heuristic wrongly skipped a plain hostmask whose second char happened to be ':', mis-listing it
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2026-08-19 01:18:27 +00:00 |
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6f9d11f83e
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captcha: clamp recaptcha/cloudflare token TTL to [60s, 86400s] — an unclamped conf value could set exp in the past (every token instantly invalid, self-DoS) or absurdly far out
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2026-08-19 01:18:13 +00:00 |
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ee3c5e761e
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geoip: bound recursion + require forward progress in the .mmdb value decoder — value_len/map_get recursed into nested maps/arrays with no depth limit (unlike resolve), so a crafted database could overflow the stack or spin on a zero-advance value; cap nesting at 32 and bail on a malformed (0-length) sub-value
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2026-08-19 01:17:32 +00:00 |
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e200779d27
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connclass: resolve hash= independently of token order — the fold only ran if password= had already been parsed, so "hash=sha256 password=<hex>" (hash first) stored the digest as a plaintext password and every login to that class failed; build() now combines <algo>:<digest> after the full token pass
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2026-08-19 01:15:26 +00:00 |
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928026c49e
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permchannels: isolate the load-time mode applier in catch_unwind so a panicking mode handler can't leave mode_sudo stuck true — which would silently disable rank/oper gating for every subsequent MODE; the flag is now always reset
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2026-08-19 01:14:34 +00:00 |
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14eb982db5
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multiline: reject an over-limit batch with a FAIL instead of silently dropping the overflowing lines — accumulate() dropped a line that exceeded multiline_maxbytes/maxlines but still returned buffered=true, so the client believed a truncated message was sent whole; now overflow flags the batch and close() drops it with a standard FAIL
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2026-08-19 01:13:39 +00:00 |
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83cdce17c5
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connflood: bound the per-IP connection-history map (prune stale buckets past 65536 tracked IPs) — it only shrank on the tick GC, so a wide source-IP spread could grow it unbounded between ticks (memory DoS)
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2026-08-19 01:12:39 +00:00 |
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a218d65371
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rpc: authenticate on the header block before buffering the request body — the httpd read up to MAX_REQUEST (256 KiB) and only then checked the Authorization header, so an unauthenticated peer reaching rpc_bind could make each connection consume memory + a worker thread; now POST+auth are validated as soon as headers are complete, before any body is read
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2026-08-19 01:05:29 +00:00 |
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5b33786a46
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rpc: refuse an all-wildcard x-line via ban.add — the mask went unvalidated, so an authenticated RPC call with "mask":"" or "*@*" installed a K/G/Z-line matching the entire network; require at least one literal host/ip/nick char
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2026-08-19 01:03:27 +00:00 |
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54c2a733fe
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password_hash: reject a PBKDF2 credential with an absurd iteration count (>10M) instead of running it — the count is read straight from the stored string, so a corrupt/hostile credential (e.g. via a compromised accounts backend) could pin a worker thread for a very long time; legitimate work factors are far below the cap
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2026-08-19 01:02:36 +00:00 |
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4248cc0479
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oper: gate the client-facing SVSLOGIN/SVSLOGOUT behind oper_svslogin (default off) — they were a pre-S2S stopgap that let any oper forge an arbitrary account login (set_login) and thus +r/account-gated access; the live path is S2S link_svslogin (source_is_service-gated), so services are unaffected — only the obsolete oper backdoor is closed
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2026-08-19 01:01:33 +00:00 |
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a80b86b50d
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perf: S2S channel-message fanout shares the line by Arc across members (relay_channel_message) instead of cloning a String per recipient — mirrors the client PRIVMSG fanout; builds at most three variants (plain / server-time / echo-services-tagged) whatever the channel size, behaviour unchanged
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2026-08-19 00:47:32 +00:00 |
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910422199b
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perf: glob_match takes a zero-allocation byte-wise path for ASCII operands (the norm for hostmasks/IPs/cloaks) instead of collecting two Vec<char> per call — it runs per-message (filter), per-user (extbans/tline) and per-channel (channelban); non-ASCII still uses the Unicode-lowercased fallback, and a proptest pins the two paths equal on ASCII
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2026-08-19 00:45:14 +00:00 |
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35bb901455
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whoisport: report the port the user actually connected to (User.port, set at accept) instead of conf("bind")/conf("bind_tls") — those are Vec-valued so conf() returned only the LAST configured listener, giving every user the same wrong port on a multi-listener server
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2026-08-19 00:43:03 +00:00 |
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25702c9541
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syslog: strip control chars (CR/LF) from the message before framing — a snotice carrying user-influenced text (nick/realname/quit reason) with an embedded newline could inject a forged syslog record; matches the CR/LF care the JSON log path already takes
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2026-08-19 00:42:30 +00:00 |
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d9d5bd069b
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filehost: refuse to sign upload tokens when filehost_jwt_secret is unset/empty/"changeme" — the default fell open, signing with a world-known key so anyone could forge a server-trusted upload authorization; now it fails closed and tells the user to fix the config
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2026-08-19 00:42:10 +00:00 |
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a09dfc74df
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auth: constant-time compare for VHOST and WEBIRC secrets — both used plain == on the config password, unlike oper/RPC/JWT secrets which already route through ct_eq; expose password_hash::ct_eq as the shared comparator and use it (usernames stay plain == — not secret)
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2026-08-19 00:41:47 +00:00 |
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c72b966e0a
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mode: cap mode changes per MODE command (modes=, default 20) and advertise it as the MODES= ISUPPORT token — an uncapped modestring like MODE #c +bbbb… dispatched a handler per letter, each fanning out to the whole channel and every S2S link (amplification DoS); matches InspIRCd's MODES limit
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2026-08-19 00:40:58 +00:00 |
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11cec9fc36
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s2s/xline: reject a malformed ADDLINE duration instead of coercing it to 0 (= a silent permanent ban), and make add_xline expiry saturating (n.saturating_add) so a peer sending duration=u64::MAX can't overflow-panic the debug build or wrap in release
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2026-08-19 00:39:40 +00:00 |
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bbe4ee4567
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http: bound spawn_http concurrency (http_max_concurrent, default 32) like spawn_crypto — it spawned one unbounded OS thread per call, so a pre-auth VERIFY/REGISTER flood could exhaust threads and hammer the accounts backend; at capacity the command now fails with TEMPORARILY_UNAVAILABLE instead
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2026-08-19 00:39:01 +00:00 |
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801614605f
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http: verify TLS certs by default + cap the response body — set_verify(NONE) unconditionally let a MITM read/forge the account-registration & captcha traffic (usernames, emails, plaintext passwords) POSTed to operator-configured https URLs; now the connector's cert+hostname check stays on (opt out with http_tls_verify=no), and read_to_end is bounded to 4 MiB so a hostile endpoint can't OOM the worker
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2026-08-19 00:37:50 +00:00 |
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6682227f81
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denychans: bound redirect recursion — a badchan redirect re-enters Server::join (which re-runs denychans), so a redirect loop (#a->#b->#a) or a redirect into a broad badchan glob recursed until the single-threaded daemon stack-overflowed from one JOIN; cap the chain at 8 hops via a RedirDepth guard in ext
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2026-08-19 00:36:29 +00:00 |
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a4f4c29a8a
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connectban: clamp the IPv6 keep-hextets to >=1 — connectban_ipv6cidr between 1 and 15 made keep==0, so the z-line glob became "*" and banned every IPv6 address on the internet (and bucketed all v6 clients into one key); mirrors the v4 clamp(1,4)
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2026-08-19 00:34:53 +00:00 |
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c99f16f3e0
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webirc: require a non-empty source-IP mask on a webirc block — an empty ipmask meant "any IP", so a maskless webirc=<password> block turned one shared secret into a full host/IP spoof (bypassing z-lines, DNSBL, GeoIP, cloak) for anyone who learned it; now the gateway's connecting IP must match the block's ipmask
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2026-08-19 00:34:25 +00:00 |
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f56b68d6f5
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resolver: close an off-path DNS spoof — connect() the UDP socket so the kernel drops replies from any IP but the nameserver, and use a CSPRNG per-query transaction id instead of the hardcoded 0x4543/0x4544 (which were in the public source, so rDNS/DNSBL answers could be forged with no guessing)
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2026-08-19 00:33:18 +00:00 |
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1763a95985
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s2s: validate a message source actually lives behind the link it arrived on (source_behind) before applying remote JOIN/IJOIN/KICK/TOPIC/MODE/KILL/PRIVMSG — else a peer could forge ops/kicks/bans/topics/service-badged messages for users behind another link; NICK/QUIT/PART already guarded this, now the channel-state handlers do too
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2026-08-19 00:32:09 +00:00 |
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235c747c03
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refactor: WEBIRC gateways and +G censor rules are named structs (WebircGateway/CensorRule) instead of positional tuples — self-documenting field access, no (_, g, _) index guessing; extends the OperBlock pattern
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2026-08-18 23:31:21 +00:00 |
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